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Housing, the welfare state, and the global financial crisis: what is the connection?  
 
Abstract: 
Analyses of the global financial crisis that assign causality to the erosion of parts of the welfare state 
that protected individuals miss the importance of macro-level regulation that protected firms and the 
financial system from itself. Post-Depression macro-level regulation of finance prevented the emergence 
of mismatched maturities where deposits lacked state guarantees, and thus prevented runs on banks or 
near-banks. A balance sheet approach shows that macro-regulation linked long duration liabilities in 
housing finance (mortgages) to long duration assets (pensions). Deregulation permitted the 
reemergence of mismatched maturities, providing both a necessary and sufficient condition for the 
current financial crisis.  
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Text: 
 
In 25 years as an electrician I have had to tighten and loosen many screws. I only 
ever broke one screw I was tightening, but I've broken a few hundred of those I was 
trying to loosen.  
LeĐh Wałęsa to Adam Michnik 
 
The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 seems to belie many predictions by conservative (and 
some left) critics that the welfare state would bring capitalism to its knees.* Instead, the proximate 
causes for the current crisis lie in financial speculation around mortgages, and moreover in the United 
States, which has the most limited formal welfare state of the rich OECD countries and one of the lowest 
rates of publicly owned housing. This seems to place the origins of the crisis at some distance from the 
welfare state. I argue that the current crisis did emerge from the welfare state, but not in sense in which 
this is normally argued. The regulation of housing finance was a central feature of the post-war welfare 
state, if, like Polanyi, we understand the welfare state as a system for sheltering society and not just 
individuals from market and life risks.1 The erosion, rather than the expansion, of this macro-level 
welfare provision in the United States created the pre-conditions for the crisis. Post-Depression macro-
level regulation of finance prevented the emergence of mismatched maturities where deposits lacked 
state guarantees, and thus prevented runs on banks or near-banks. A balance sheet approach shows 
that macro-regulation linked long duration liabilities in housing finance (mortgages) to long duration 
assets (pensions), minimizing mismatched maturities. Deregulation permitted the reemergence of 
mismatched maturities, providing both a necessary and sufficient condition for the current financial 
crisis.  
Put simply, the erosion of the welfare state in the 1990s and 2000s was not just a story about 
increased micro- or individual risk.2 The erosion of the broad welfare state occurred at both the micro- 
and macro-level. Deregulation and non-regulation also exposed financial firms to more systemic risk. In 
arguments that housing served as a substitute for a slowly eroding welfare state for workers, the action 
all takes place at the micro- or individual level.3 This kind of argument establishes only a necessary, but 
not sufficient condition for the financial crisis. It explains mounting pressure to enter the housing market 
and thus the increase in household debt as housing prices adapted to higher demand. But demand side 
conditions should only have produced a temporary run up in housing prices and then a normal 
recession, rather than the catastrophic crisis that occurred. The strongest counter-argument in favor of 
sufficiency coming from erosion of the micro-welfare state is that eroding micro-level social protection 
had as its mirror image a worsening distribution of income, and that in turn the concentration of income 
at the top enabled – but did not mandate – the deregulation of finance that allowed dangerously 
mismatched maturities for assets and liabilities to reemerge in the finance sector.4 
The usual analyses linking erosion of the micro-welfare state to the financial crisis miss the 
equally important erosion of the macro-welfare state, which concerns the supply side for housing 
finance. The macro-level welfare state historically protected banks from each other and from depositors 
by removiŶg ŵisŵatĐhed ŵatuƌities fƌoŵ ďaŶks͛ ďalaŶĐe sheets, pƌoteĐtiŶg ďaŶks fƌoŵ ƌuiŶous 
competition, and preventing various forms of legal fraud in the sale of securities. Deregulation removed 
these buffers against market risk, which as Schelkle (this issue) notes had been a form of social 
protection for capital.5 Deregulation allowed financial firms to recreate dangerously mismatched 
                                                          
* This article is part of a special section titled ͚IŶ the spotlight of Đƌisis: How social policies create, correct 
aŶd ĐoŵpeŶsate fiŶaŶĐial ŵaƌkets͛ fƌoŵ a ĐoŶfeƌeŶĐe ;͚The soĐial poliĐǇ diŵeŶsioŶ of ƌegulatoƌǇ Đƌisis 
ŵaŶageŵeŶt iŶ the EU aŶd the U“͛Ϳ that was held at the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, 19-20 November 
2010. 
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maturities on their balance sheets. Given that maturity mismatches are natural to finance, and that they 
did not flow directly from an erosion of the micro-welfare state, the erosion of welfare state protection 
for individuals cannot be seen as a sufficient cause for the crisis. By contrast, deregulation allowed 
financial firms to link different parts of the financial system in ways that produced a non-linear response 
to default on subprime mortgages. In essence, deregulation permitted the conditions for a classic bank 
run to re-emerge, and moreover at the heart of the financial system. By doing so it created sufficient 
conditions for the crisis. 
The contraction of the micro- and macro-level welfare state respectively provided both 
necessary and sufficient conditions for a massive financial crisis, by allowing financial elites to gamble 
ǁith households͛ siŶgle ďiggest liaďilitǇ, aŶd thus ďaŶks͛ siŶgle ďiggest asset. This gaŵďliŶg tƌaŶsfoƌŵed 
what otherwise might have been just a normal recession and financial crisis into a near death 
eǆpeƌieŶĐe foƌ gloďal Đapitalisŵ. To ďe suƌe, otheƌ thiŶgs ŵatteƌed as ǁell, ŵost ŶotaďlǇ ChiŶa͛s 
williŶgŶess to ƌeĐǇĐle AŵeƌiĐaŶ tƌade defiĐits aŶd the ƌatiŶgs ageŶĐies͛ ŵoďilizatioŶ of the ǁƌoŶg 
mathematical models for default, but these also are simply necessary conditions that I will ignore out of 
space limitations.6  
This argument requires four steps. First, I show why housing matters: only the liabilities and 
assets created via housing finance were large enough to cause a systemic crisis in the core of global 
finance. Second, I position housing in the usual welfare state literature: housing and more particularly 
housing finance was an important systemic component of the post war welfare state by virtue of the 
balance sheet connection between long duration liabilities and long duration assets. Housing finance 
and pension systems are mutually constitutive because of the need to purge maturity mismatches from 
banking systems. Third, I briefly show how the erosion of non-housing welfare state provision in the 
United States, and particularly defined benefit pensions, led to a greater reliance on home equity as a 
substitute for traditional forms of social protection – the micro-erosion. This increased the volume of 
mortgage debt, and thus the potential systemic damage from a crisis of mortgage debt. Fourth, I ask 
why housing finance changed in ways that reintroduced mismatched maturities – the macro-level 
erosion of the post war welfare state. This mismatch activated the risks discussed in parts two and 
three. Risk and size combined to make mortgage debt potentially lethal for parts of the financial system, 
but neither alone was necessarily a problem for the entire financial system. Points three and four are 
connected. Mortgage assets/liabilities previously were mediated through the state or quasi- state 
entities in ways that removed risks to individuals and firms. Deregulation allowed financial firms to 
unbundle those assets on the theory that this would enable individual households and firms to manage 
risk better. Instead it led to increased systemic risk. But if mortgage assets had been small in relation to 
GDP, reintroducing mismatched maturities would not have threatened systemic stability as much.  
The conclusion argues that sufficient causes must be found in the specific ways in which the 
financial sector used deregulation to pursue profitability through regulatory arbitrage that linked parts 
of the financial system to housing finance. Any financial asset could have been the raw material for this 
regulatory arbitrage. And indeed, up until the 2000s, many other financial instruments were the object 
of regulatory arbitrage. But as noted in point one, only housing was large enough and prevalent enough 
in household portfolios to cause a systemic crisis. Housing finance was the last screw holding the old 
regulatory regime together. Deregulation and non-regulation opened a window for the regulatory 
arbitrage that recreated mismatched maturities and thus broke that screw.  
 
1: Size matters: Why housing finance was central to a systemic crisis 
Three features of the housing finance system made what should have been a garden variety 
recession into a massive global crisis. Only mortgage debts – which are assets on the balance sheets of 
financial firms – were large enough to seriously affect the solvency of nearly all major financial 
institutions in the United States. Only mortgage debt was widespread enough in society to affect more 
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than a small fraction of the population, and thus affect aggregate demand broadly. And, crucially, 
housing prices are highly opaque and impacted as compared to prices for equities and industrial bonds. 
These three factors meant that any crisis emerging from housing related debt would have large and 
widespread effects that simultaneously were somewhat unknowable, heightening uncertainty. 
Size: Mortgage debt, securitized or not, generally constitutes one of the largest or the largest 
asset in many OECD countries. Table 1 shows where mortgage debt in pre-bubble 2002 exceeded 
capitalization of the equity market, public debt market or half the private debt market in a wide range of 
countries. Data limitations mean the exclusion of Australia͛s, New Zealand͛s aŶd NoƌǁaǇ͛s ďoŶd ŵaƌkets 
ďut these aƌe pƌoďaďlǇ iŶ the ͞Yes͟ ĐategoƌǇ. As housing prices rose from 2002 through 2007, mortgage 
debt relative to GDP also increased by roughly one-third, increasing its relative size in financial markets. 
Any crisis in the mortgage market thus would threaten the stability of the financial system. 
To be sure, household mortgage burdens vary widely, as Table 1 shows. For example, Italians 
and other southern Europeans typically buy houses with large cash payments, perhaps in order to 
launder untaxed cash income, while Austrians move very infrequently. An extremely difficult foreclosure 
process and the lack of a covered bond market until 2005 also deterred Italian banks from making 
mortgages.7 But with a few exceptions, mortgage debt in most countries vastly exceeds bank capital. 
Anything depressing the value of mortgage debt thus potentially puts pressure on the balance sheets of 
financial institutions.  
Scope: Mortgage debt is not only significant in most financial markets, but also affects many 
households. Every rich OECD economy save Germany had an owner occupied housing rate above the 50 
% level in 2002 (Table 1, last column). With some exceptions, owner occupied housing is typically 
purchased using mortgage debt. While owners generally retire this debt, at any given time a significant 
proportion of households carry mortgage debt. In the US, for example, roughly one-third of households 
rent, one-third own homes free and clear, and one-third carry a mortgage. Even though cross national 
variation means that changes in housing prices or interest rates do not uniformly affect OECD 
economies, the size and scope of mortgage debt makes interest rates a particularly potent tool for 
political manipulation of the business cycle, and makes housing macro-economically important.8 These 
effects are particularly strong in the other Anglo-economies, where variable interest rate loans are more 
common than in the United States and where interest rate changes propagate fairly quickly into 
mortgage interest payments. All the Anglo-economies, the Netherlands and Norway, and to a lesser 
extent Denmark and Sweden combine high levels of debt and high levels of homeownership. 
The scale and dispersal of housing debt thus presents a much greater threat to the entire 
financial system and economy than other forms of consumer debt, such as credit cards, student loans, 
or automobile purchase loans. The 2007-09 global financial crisis demonstrated the effects of even 
limited losses on mortgage loans. Losses on subprime and Alt-A9 mortgages amounted to roughly $0.5 
tƌillioŶ ďǇ August ϮϬϬϴ. BǇ ǁipiŶg out ďaŶks͛ Đapital, this suffiĐed to trigger de facto or de jure bank 
nationalizations everywhere.10 For this reason, as we will see below, states have intensely regulated 
housing finance. Reciprocally, only this massive state intervention made widespread debt financed 
housing purchase possible in a modern economy. 
By contrast, total US credit card and automobile debt in 2008 was roughly $1.5 trillion, less than 
only the $1.6 trillion of subprime and Alt-A mortgages outstanding in 2007. Mortgage loans in default at 
mid-2008 constituted 4.5 % of the $11.2 trillion in American residential mortgages. The equivalent 
proportion of consumer loans would be only $57 billion. This is non-trivial but not enough to trigger a 
systemic crisis. Similarly, the dot.com bust of 2000-02 obliterated $5 trillion in US stock market equity. 
But these losses affected only a small slice of US households, as the top one percent of income earners 
hold 34 % of US equities, and the top 10 % hold 75 % of US equities. Their losses did not affect spending 
by the broad mass of the population. Moreover, these losses were largely of unrealized capital gains, 
and thus not connected to corresponding debts on the balance sheets of financial firms. By contrast, the 
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crisis centered on mortgage debt affected the balance sheets of financial institutions and, through 
households, the level of consumer demand. 
 
 
Table 1:  Mortgage debt as a % of various capital market indicators in OECD-19, 2002 
  
 
Mortgage debt 
as % of GDP, 
2002 
Mortgages 
% of total 
capital 
market* 
Mortgage 
debt larger 
than equity 
market? 
Mortgage 
debt larger 
than gross 
public debt? 
Mortgage debt 
more than 50% 
of private bond 
market?** 
Owner 
occupation 
rate, %, 
2002 
 
Australia 50.8 n/a 
 
YES n/a 70  
Austria 16.3 3.7 YES 
  
56  
Belgium 27.9 2.3 
 
YES 
 
71  
Canada 43.1 12.3 
  
YES 66  
Denmark 74.3 12.1 YES YES YES 51  
Finland 31.8 6.6 YES 
 
YES 58  
France 22.8 3.6 
   
55  
Germany 54.0 8.8 YES YES 
 
42  
Ireland 36.5 7.6 
 
YES YES 78  
Italy 11.4 2.7 
   
80  
Japan 36.8 6.0 
  
YES 60  
Netherlands 78.8 9.0 
 
YES 
 
53  
New Zealand 56.2 n/a YES YES n/a 65  
Norway 50.2 n/a YES YES n/a 77  
Portugal 50.0 11.2 YES 
 
YES 64  
Spain 38.0 9.7 
  
YES 83  
Sweden 48.4 9.1 
  
YES 61  
UK 64.3 9.1 YES YES YES 68  
USA 58.0 11.4 YES YES 
 
69  
* total capital market = sum of equity and public and private bond markets; ** 50% is used as the 
standard because mortgages typically are part of the private bond market and thus cannot exceed 
that market; n/a = data not available. 
  
Sources: Author calculations from World Federation of Exchanges, http://www.world-
exchanges.org/statistics; IMF, Global Financial Stability Report, September 2003; OECD, Economic 
Outlook, # 80, December 2006. 
  
 
Pricing:  Finally, housing prices are not transparent. While insiders can complicate pricing on 
stock exchanges through dark pool trading and front running, this does not prevent the emergence of 
market clearing prices on a daily basis in most OECD equity markets. Roughly speaking the same is true 
for bond markets. Prices in both markets are published daily (indeed almost instantaneously) and are 
meaningful at an international level. By contrast, housing prices reflect deeply impacted local knowledge 
and for the most part only locally relevant. Published prices are usually offer prices and American listing 
services refuse to publish actual prices for consummated sales. Yet home sale prices are central to 
understanding the depth and direction of any crisis involving mortgages. Those prices determine 
whether the collateral behind a given group of mortgages exceeds, equals or is less than the debt those 
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mortgages represent. This uncertainty was a central feature of the 2007-09 crisis. No one could mark to 
market or accurately assess the risk involved in buying a given mortgage backed security. Summing up 
this section, if someone wanted to create a systemic crisis at the heart of the global financial system one 
of the best places to start would be housing, because of its scale, connection to households and financial 
firms, and opacity. 
 
2: Housing finance and the welfare state:  Why balance sheets matter 
2a:  Welfare and housing / finance 
Despite the salience of housing finance, political science as a discipline largely ignored it before 
the global financial crisis erupted.11 Even afterward, housing finance receives remarkably little attention. 
A full teǆt seaƌĐh oŶ ͚FaŶŶie Mae͛ oƌ ͚ŵoƌtgages͛ iŶ aƌĐhiǀed American Political Science Association 
conference papers from 2002 through 2010 shows that out of roughly 1200 papers per year, fewer than 
five in any given year mention either. Typically, fewer than 10 papers per conference look at housing per 
se and almost all of those examine narrow urban housing policy issues.12  
Though sparse, a literature on housing as a welfare state issue did emerge three decades ago. 
This literature posits two kinds of inverse relationships between owner occupied, debt-financed housing 
and welfare state provision. This literature thus focuses on the micro- or individual level welfare state, 
asking how housing affects individual preference for and services from the welfare state. But there is 
also is also a functional but deeply political relationship systemic or macro-level connection between 
housing finance and the welfare state that this literature overlooks. This omission blinds the housing 
literature the causes of the recent global financial crisis. 
 Jim Kemeny and Frank Castles generated the classic arguments about the inverse relationship 
between owner-occupied housing and the development of the welfare state.13 These arguments 
focused on the generative effects of housing on later welfare state provision. Kemeny argued that the 
greater the degree of private ownership, the weaker the entire welfare state ǁould ďe. Castles͛ Đlaiŵ 
was narrower: higher levels of private homeownership produce weaker and smaller public pensions, 
particularly second tier pensions. 
Kemeny argued for a trade-off between owner-occupied residential property and the quantity 
and quality of welfare state benefits. Although the total life-cycle cost of owner-occupied or rented 
housing was the same at any given level of income, the temporal distribution of those costs varied. 
Would-be owners had to save for a down payment varying from 10 to 50 percent of the purchase price 
and then faced a front-loaded schedule of payments as they amortized a mortgage over the next 15 to 
30 years. Buying a house thus compressed the bulk of the life-ĐǇĐle Đost of housiŶg iŶto a household͛s 
early years. Renting, by contrast, involves more level payments across the entire life cycle. The front 
loading of housing costs for owner-occupiers inclined them against higher taxes for social services and 
transfers, as these taxes competed in the household budget with saving and amortizing a mortgage. 
Kemeny thus argued that the level of home ownership was not a natural outcome of rising or high per 
capita income levels, but instead reflected political choices by voters and parties.14  
FƌaŶk Castles Ŷaƌƌoǁed KeŵeŶǇ͛s Đlaiŵ, arguing for a specific trade-off between individual 
homeownership and robust public pension spending.15 Housing potentially constitutes not only the 
single gƌeatest iteŵ iŶ ŵost ƌetiƌees͛ ďudgets, ďut also, ǁith food, oŶe of the least suďstitutaďle oƌ 
dispensable. The imputed income from freehold homeownership is a functional substitute for public 
pension income. Castles makes a causal argument that settler societies with high levels of 
homeownership prior to the emergence of public pension systems were least likely to develop robust 
public pensions, because freehold ownership of housing substantially reduced the income requirements 
of the home-owning elderly. Echoing Kemeny, Castles also noted that better off parts of the elderly 
population were more likely to own houses and thus were less favorably disposed towards higher taxes 
to provide cash income to elderly renters. In addition, while both renters and owners bear the cost of 
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property taxes, these taxes are most visible to owners, and thus draw the most resistance.16 Private, 
debt financed homeownership splits the natural elderly constituency for expanded social spending. 
Castles and Ferrera later expanded this argument to southern Europe, arguing for a distinctive 
combination of private but debt free homeownership and weak state taxation capacity.17 Debt free 
ownership emerged from the combination of a large rural population and considerable tax evasion 
through the cash purchase of property. In turn, weak taxation capacity limited the universality of public 
pensions. 
BuildiŶg oŶ KeŵeŶǇ aŶd Castles͛ ǁoƌk, Gösta EspiŶg-Andersen, David Malpass and Ben Ansell 
each present narrower arguments about the partisan use of housing policy to affect individual 
preferences.18 Where Kemeny and Castles made unmediated leaps from homeownership to voting 
preferences, Esping-Andersen looked at how individual homeownership demobilized the working class 
by pitting owners against renters and creating a psychology of personal gain. Malpass and Ansell, by 
contrast, separately look at how homeownership affected the politics of cutbacks in mature welfare 
states, rather than its build-out. They both argue, albeit in different ways, that voting preferences are 
seŶsitiǀe to households͛ asset holdiŶgs. IŶ the saŵe spiƌit as the oƌigiŶal aƌguŵeŶts, theǇ aƌgue that 
rising asset values diminish voter preferences for a broader welfare state. All of these arguments focus 
on individual preferences. But the financial crisis was a systemic crisis. Balance sheets, which aggregate 
assets and liabilities, are what connect micro-preferences to macro-regulation and thus to the crisis.  
2b: A balance sheet approach 
Kemeny and Castles make what are essentially political arguments based on cash flows. Ansell 
moves us one step forward by looking at the consequences of changes in the values of stocks of assets, 
but still has a micro perspective. These arguments have underspecified political links between objective 
cash flows out of households and equally objective public and private cash flows back into those 
households (or changes in asset prices). But an equally compelling and more direct argument for the 
complementary link between renting and public pensions on the one hand and private indebted 
homeownership and weak public pensions (or more precisely between private, indebted 
homeownership and private pensions) on the other hand, can be found in the necessary links between 
both sides of the balance sheet.  
Put simply, all assets on a balance sheet must have a corresponding liability on the other side of 
the balance sheet. What this means is that mortgages, which are liabilities to the borrower, must show 
up as assets oŶ soŵeoŶe else͛s ďalaŶĐe sheet. The natural holders of medium and long term mortgage 
assets are private pension plans or funded public pensions. This removes a potential source of instability 
from both banking and pension systems by matching maturities for long-term assets and liabilities. 
Before the Great Depression, the absence of state intervention in mortgage markets in most countries 
limited residential mortgage finance, because banks had to finance long term assets using short term 
liabilities. After the Great Depression, states in nearly all OECD countries developed housing finance 
systems that contained this safer maturity match. Regulation of housing finance was not only part and 
parcel of the more general regulation of finance, but also, given the scale of housing finance, one of its 
most important aspects. 
Maturity mismatches occur when an organization borrows in credit markets on a short term 
basis and then reinvests the proceeds into less liquid, longer duration assets. Maturity refers to length of 
time before a given debt must be repaid. A loan or bond with a one year maturity must be repaid in one 
year; a ten year loan or bond after ten years. Mismatched maturities are dangerous. If the short term 
lender calls in her loan from the actor who has borrowed short term in order to lend or invest long term, 
that long term investor may not be able to generate enough cash to repay the short term loan. What 
ensues is either a forced or panicked liquidation of the long term asset at a loss, or default on the short 
term liability. Banks are the classic locus of mismatched maturities in most economies. Indeed, banks 
eǆist pƌeĐiselǇ iŶ oƌdeƌ to tuƌŶ shoƌt teƌŵ liaďilities ;depositoƌ͛s ŵoŶeǇͿ iŶto loŶg teƌŵ assets ;loaŶs to 
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homebuyers and industrial firms), which is why they are vulnerable to bank runs. Pre-1940s US banks 
tried to limit their maturity mismatch by structuring mortgages as three to five year balloon loans, 
where the whole principal was due at once at the end of term. Even so, the 1930s collapse of farm land 
and urban housing prices caused many banks to fail, provoking a vicious cycle of bank runs, property 
liƋuidatioŶ aŶd falliŶg pƌiĐes foƌ ďaŶks͛ Đollateƌal assets.  
Most analyses focus on state efforts after the 1930s to resolve this core maturity mismatch 
using depositor guarantees or insurance to stabilize bank deposits. These guarantees were valium for 
potentially panicky depositors. But states also segmented financial markets to remove the maturity 
ŵisŵatĐh fƌoŵ ďaŶks͛ ďook. TheǇ sought to tie housiŶg fiŶaŶĐe to pensions as a way to match long term 
assets to long term liabilities. Pension fund balance sheets are the logical place to lodge long term assets 
like mortgages, and in particular the historically unusual 30 year self-amortizing mortgage that is 
currently standard in the United States. Pension and insurance funds have stable and predictable long 
term liabilities to their customers, particularly as rational consumers should opt to annuitize pension 
income. To fund these liabilities, pension funds need assets that generate a stable and predictable cash 
flow on the other side of their balance sheet. Mortgages provide that stable and predictable cash flow. 
Mortgages are not the only way to get stability, but they nevertheless account for a large proportion of 
pension assets everywhere. While equities have come to comprise an ever larger share of pension 
assets, their volatility makes them less suitable for annuitization, as Burtless (this issue) shows.19 
Moreover, in the first post-war decades, equity markets were too small to be more than a supplement in 
most countries. Finally, while government debt is also stable, it is also low yielding. 
Purely on a balance sheet basis, then, we would expect to see the Castles/Kemeny relationship. 
Figure 1 shows that even as late as 2009, after years of deregulation and a steady shift of pension assets 
towards equities, there was still a very strong connection between the size of all pension assets, 
included funded public pensions,  and mortgages relative to GDP.20 Contrary to Castles/Kemeny, though, 
the issue is not public versus private pensions, but rather whether those pensions are funded. Public and 
private funded pensions are naturally matched by widespread private indebted homeownership; public 
Pay As You Go (PAYGO) pensions are naturally matched by widespread rental housing. PAYGO pensions 
are funded out of current tax revenues, while funded pensions are paid out of the income from capital, 
i.e. from an explicit asset. The funded parts of pension systems in social democratic Sweden and 
Denmark, for example, both hold large pools of mortgage debt. The pre-2000 reform Swedish AP 
pension funds, for example, held assets equal to about 40 % of GDP and were a major source of funding 
for public housing. In 2000, mortgages constituted 25 % of total assets and 33 % of fixed income assets 
for the First and Second AP funds.21 Covered mortgage bonds similarly constituted 55 % of the assets in 
DeŶŵaƌk͛s seĐoŶd tieƌ ATP peŶsioŶ fuŶd iŶ ϭϵϵϴ, aŶd eǀeŶ ŵoƌe iŶ ŵulti-employer pension funds and 
life insurance firms that year.22  
The balance sheet connection between private pensions and mortgages is not simply functional. 
As Kemeny argues, housing markets reflect political choices about who will be shielded from market 
risks and how that buffering will be done. But put aside the meaningful differences among OECD welfare 
states and step back to look at the broader picture. Regardless of their political coloration, all the OECD 
states regulated their financial markets after World War II. They tried to segment their financial systems 
in ways that among other things reduced maturity mismatches in the financing of housing and industry. 
While the matching of housing assets and pension liabilities looks natural, it emerged from deliberate 
state policy.23 
Private maturity matching had already started in the United States in the 1940s. Pension funds 
sought long term returns by directly building and operating large real estate complexes. Thus in the 
1940s Metropolitan Life Insurance company built over 20,000 apartments in the Stuyvesant Town-Peter 
Cooper Village aŶd ‘iǀeƌtoŶ Đoŵpleǆes iŶ Neǁ Yoƌk CitǇ. Met Life͛s Đustoŵeƌs iŶ effeĐt fuŶded theiƌ 
own pension and life insurance annuities with their rental and mortgage payments. Yet this meant that  
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Figure 1:   
 
Source:  Author calculations from OECD and European Mortgage Foundation data 
 
Met Life was both exposed to the vicissitudes of the New York real estate market and directly involved 
in property management. Compare this to the current holdings of the Teachers Insurance and Annuity 
Association part of TIAA-C‘EF, the AŵeƌiĐaŶ pƌofessoƌs͛ peŶsioŶ fuŶd. Its holdiŶgs of ĐoŵŵeƌĐial ƌeal 
estate mortgages in the United States provide a match for its traditional guaranteed annuity product. 
Direct real estate holdings, commercial mortgages, and mortgage backed securities accounted for 45 
percent of its assets in March 2010.24 Yet three-fourths of its real estate and mortgage exposure takes 
the form of mortgage backed securities (MBS). Mortgage securitization bundles large numbers of 
mortgages together – usually 500 to 1000 – and sells the rights to income from this bundle to the capital 
market. MBS thus remove the need for direct property management and in principle provide geographic 
diversification. How was the shift from direct ownership towards MBS accomplished?  
As Kenneth Snowden shows, the US federal government responded to the collapse of the 
housing market and the banking system with a comprehensive set of new institutions on both the 
supply and demand side of the housing finance market.25 The Federal Home Owners͛ LoaŶ CoƌpoƌatioŶ 
ƌefiŶaŶĐed ƌoughlǇ ϭ ŵillioŶ ŵoƌtgages afteƌ ϭϵϯϯ ďǇ eǆĐhaŶgiŶg its ďoŶds foƌ ŵoƌtgages oŶ ďaŶks͛ 
books. In doing so, it restructured housing finance away from shorter term (3 to 5 years), balloon 
payment, high down-payment, variable interest rate, interest only mortgages and towards the typical 
contemporary longer term, low down-payment, fixed rate, self-amortizing US mortgage. The Federal 
National Mortgage Association (1938, later Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Banks emerged as 
successor institutions to the HOLC. They became the primary supply side force in housing finance. On 
the demand side, the Federal Housing Authority (FHA, 1934) (and to a lesser extent the Veterans 
HousiŶg AuthoƌitǇ aŶd the Fedeƌal Faƌŵeƌs͛ HousiŶg Authoƌity) insured mortgages that met their 
underwriting criteria.26   
Fannie Mae (and later its sister Government Sponsored Enterprise, Freddie Mac) and the FHA 
standardized and stabilized the demand side of the housing finance market. Underwriting criteria for 
insurance or mortgage purchase homogenized both home buyers and the houses they bought, creating 
a relatively uniform asset that could be packaged and resold. Standardized, government guaranteed 
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mortgages enabled pension funds and insurance firms to distance themselves from property 
management and instead buy a pure financial asset to balance their books. At the same time, the 
goǀeƌŶŵeŶt took ŵoƌtgages aŶd thus the ŵatuƌitǇ ŵisŵatĐh off ďaŶks͛ ďooks. IŶitiallǇ the liŶk oĐĐuƌƌed 
through straightforward government debt, albeit based on houses. Like HOLC, Fannie Mae originally 
bought mortgages from banks. It financed those purchases by borrowing in capital markets. Capital 
markets thus bought Fannie͛s ;aŶd lateƌ Fƌeddie͛sͿ deďt, ƌatheƌ thaŶ aŶ MB“. DuƌiŶg the ϭϵϳ0s, Fannie 
developed the MBS, and began to turn itself into a pure servicer of mortgages on behalf of buyers of 
those residential MBS.27 This transformed individual mortgages into a kind of corporate bond, replacing 
the need for Fannie Mae to actually hold mortgages on its books (as assets) and debts to its funders (as 
liabilities). Federal government interventions thus eventually created a new class of liquid, long-term 
asset that peŶsioŶ fuŶds Đould ďuǇ, ƌeŵoǀiŶg ŵisŵatĐhed ŵatuƌities fƌoŵ ďaŶks͛ ďalaŶĐe sheets. 
In other countries the transformation of housing debt into a liquid financial asset to match 
pension fund liabilities was somewhat more straightforward, though as Schwartz and Seabrooke note 
some states used control over housing finance to shift funds towards industry.28 In Norway, Den Norske 
Stats Husbank funded municipalities and cooperative housing associations using government funds, and 
held mortgages on its own books. It typically supplied more than half of mortgage funding. Like the 
various US agencies, it not only standardized credit but also the actual physical structures that credit 
financed. In Iceland the Housing Financing Fund (Íbúðalánasjóðs) and its two predecessors were the 
primary supplier of mortgage credit, and their bonds eventually constituted between 35 and 40 % of 
private second tier pension assets in the 1990s. In the case that most resembles the United States, the 
Netherlands, a private but state backed firm, the Homeownership Guarantee Fund (Stichting 
Waarborgfonds Eigen Woningen, WEW) insures residential MBS against default through the Nationale 
Hypotheek Garantie. NGH consolidated a number of municipal schemes insuring mortgages. As Figure 1 
shows, the Netherlands has enormous private pension funds. Finally, some states left mortgages on 
ďaŶks͛ ďooks, ďut iŶ the foƌŵ of Đoǀeƌed ďoŶds. As ǁith residential MBS, covered bonds are bundles of 
mortgages that theoretically are sold onward to outside investors. Unlike residential MBS, covered 
ďoŶds staǇ oŶ ďaŶks͛ ďooks ǁith a ďaŶk guaƌaŶtee agaiŶst Đƌedit ƌisks. DeŶŵaƌk has Euƌope͛s ŵost 
developed system of covered bonds, and Danish pension funds are heavy purchasers of those bonds. 
 
2c: The macro-welfare state 
Why did this macro-regulation of housing finance matter? The most visible and more studied 
tools of the welfare state – pensions, unemployment insurance, and health insurance – all remove 
market and life risks from individuals. Government reconstruction of housing finance markets post-war 
helped to remove risk from the financial system. These interventions resolved both the maturity 
mismatch problem for deposit taking banks and banks͛ interest rate risk around long term mortgages.29 
Banks taking what inevitably were short term public deposits could not easily transform those deposits 
into mortgages with the 15 to 30 year maturities typical of post war mortgages.  
Micro- and macro-regulation intersected in the homogenization of both the supply and demand 
side of housiŶg fiŶaŶĐe. The ŶuŵďiŶg ƌegulaƌitǇ of the apaƌtŵeŶts ĐoŶstƌuĐted uŶdeƌ “ǁedeŶ͛s 
Miljonprogrammet is the extreme example of this homogenization. But even in the United States, state 
ƌegulatioŶ of housiŶg fiŶaŶĐe hoŵogeŶized the ŵaƌket. OŶ the ďoƌƌoǁeƌ͛s side, FaŶŶie Mae͛s ;aŶd lateƌ 
Fƌeddie MaĐ͛sͿ poliĐǇ of oŶlǇ puƌĐhasiŶg loaŶs that ĐoŶfoƌŵed to theiƌ uŶdeƌǁƌitiŶg staŶdaƌds taƌgeted 
and created a homogeneous suďuƌďaŶ ǁhite ŵiddle Đlass. CoŶfoƌŵiŶg ;i.e. ͚pƌiŵe͛Ϳ loaŶs ƌeƋuiƌed 
borrowers to make a 10 percent down payment (i.e. be below a 90 percent loan to value ratio), have a 
credit rating that put them into the top 75 percent of the population, and expend no more than 28 
percent of their gross income on direct housing expenses (principal, interest, property taxes and 
insurance). In addition the loan amount was capped in most markets at 125 percent of the national 
median home price. Credit ratings and loan limits respectively set a floor and a ceiling on loan size, 
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home size, and the incomes of potential Fannie Mae and FHA borrowers. The FHA and VA also regulated 
quality and size standards for new construction, producing the uniform suburbs of the 1950s and 
1960s.30 Both sets of criteria assured very low default rates on mortgages, and easy resale in case of 
default. Default rates on Fannie and Freddie insured mortgages historically ran at about 0.5 % of loans. 
This homogenization helped to standardize the MBS constructed from individual mortgages, making 
them more predictable and thus more attractive to pension funds. 
Segmentation of US housing finance thus reduced the probability and potential severity of 
systemic financial stress coming from the housing market. Pari passu, this regulation was even greater in 
Europe. By matching maturities in the supply and demand for mortgages as long term assets and 
liabilities, regulation reduced the risk and consequences of bank runs. To be sure, risk could not be 
eliminated. Borrowers who did not meet the underwriting criteria of the federal agencies also wanted 
access to housing finance. The US sub-prime market emerged to service this demand, naturally at much 
higher interest rates. But banks could not easily move these loans off their books into the Fannie Mae-
pensions complex. The segmentation of the market both forced banks to be cautious about extending 
these kinds of loans, and protected the rest of the housing finance system from them. Segmentation put 
a circuit breaker between housing finance and the rest of the financial system. It protected bankers from 
each other. 
Finally, macro-regulation and financial market segmentation also shielded the financial system 
from the dangers of a broad economic downturn. Pension funds and insurance firms have relatively 
stable cash inflows from contributions and premia. This money has to go somewhere. By connecting 
those flows to housing finance, regulation assured a steady flow of capital to an economic sector whose 
interconnection with other goods producing sectors and whose labor intensity made it macro-
economically significant. Normal monetary policy in the United States worked most effectively through 
its effects on housing demand, helping to stabilize what would otherwise be a fairly unstable part of the 
economy.31 As the 2008-2010 recession showed, when consumers panic they understandably defer 
purchases of durables and structures. They generally cannot defer consumption of non-durables. The 
segmented housing finance system was thus self stabilizing until the deregulation of finance in the 1990s 
and the non-regulation of finance in the 2000s. 
 
3:  Erosion of the welfare state and the accretion of housing debt  
With the role played by macro-regulation now established, we can turn to the micro-level 
arguments about welfare erosion, housing and the crisis. The stylized fact behind arguments linking 
erosion of the welfare state to rising debt and in particular rising mortgage debt looks something like the 
arguments advanced in other papers in this issue: faced with stagnant wages and a falling real value of 
pensions, health insurance coverage, and other buffers against risk, households increasingly used credit 
and in particular housing based credit as a substitute buffer. As welfare state opponents succeeded in 
shifting risk off the fisc and onto individuals, housing moved to the forefront of individual strategies for 
attaining economic security.32 Home equity became a source of current and future consumption, 
emergency cash, and disguised retirement savings.  
This argument is plausible, but does not constitute a sufficient condition for the crisis. First, the 
distribution of homeownership and home equity does not match the distribution of financial stress. All 
other things being equal, younger and poorer families or individuals are more exposed to the risk of 
unemployment or uncovered health care expenses, yet these are precisely the populations that are least 
likely to own homes with substantial equity. Only 55 % of US households with incomes under $50,000 
(about 52 % of all US households) lived in owner occupied housing in 2007, versus 83 % of households 
with incomes over $50,000.33 Most of the poorer homeowners were the elderly. So we would expect to 
see a disproportionate increase in non-housing related forms of debt as work/welfare stress increased in 
the United States during the 1990s and 2000s. It was precisely the lowest income deciles that saw the 
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smallest income gains and suffered most from cutbacks in the formal US welfare state. And indeed, their 
debt levels increased disproportionately, 1992 to 2007. Average household debt for the bottom 40 % of 
the population grew by $23,100 per household those years.34 
Perhaps the rise in mortgage debt was driven by the increasingly difficult straits in which the 
upper income deciles (excluding the top decile) found themselves? While the erosion of the visible and 
invisible welfare state for higher income deciles was not as drastic as for the bottom, it can be linked 
more closely to the scale of rising mortgage debt. Two major forms of social protection eroded in the 
1990s and 2000s. The percentage of non-elderly Americans with private health insurance declined 4 
percentage points from its average level in the 1990s to 67 % by 2007. This gradual decline conceals an 
even larger rescission of coverage in terms of insurable events and out of pocket costs. Employee health 
insurance contributions increased four times faster than employee earnings from 1999 to 2007.35 
And indeed, absolute debt for deciles 40 through 80 grew even faster than for the bottom 40 %, 
at $108,000 per household. (For the top 20 % by income, household debt actually declined, though 
entirely because of falling debt among the top 1 % by income.36) So if households were substituting 
mortgage debt for public forms of social insurance, this occurred mostly in the upper half of the income 
distribution. While non-mortgage debt also rose quickly, it did not rise as quickly as mortgage debt, 
reflecting rising housing prices and thus home purchase debt, as well as cash out of home equity by 
incumbent owners (Figure 2). From 1950 through 1986, non-mortgage debt typically comprised around 
38 % of household liabilities. But from the mid-1980s on and even more quickly after 2000, the share of 
non-mortgage debt fell more or less continuously, hitting 27 % in 2006.37  
 
Figure 2: US Mortgage and other debt relative to household income, $ trillions, various dates 
 
 
Source:  Calculated from Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds Accounts of the US, Table B.100 
 
 
More ominously, and more directly tied to housing debt, a massive shift from defined benefit to 
defined contribution pensions occurred in those decades (see Table 2). This transformation of pensions 
increased the importance of privately owned housing for retirement income security. Defined 
contribution pensions are inherently more volatile, as Burtless͛s aƌtiĐle iŶ this issue Ŷotes. OŶe ƌatioŶal 
individual response is to shift resources into homeownership and home improvement. Rising prices then 
make it possiďle to ƌealize those saǀiŶgs ďǇ tƌadiŶg doǁŶ to a sŵalleƌ house afteƌ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt. AŶsell͛s 
work suggests that steadily rising nominal house prices in the 1990s inclined voters toward this 
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individual strategy rather than a collective demand for a more robust public or publicly supported 
private pension system.38 Even in the bottom quartile of US households by income, the median family 
had $80,000 of home equity in 2007, almost as much as the next two quartiles.39 Yet, as noted above, to 
trigger a systemic crisis this rising demand for housing as a savings vehicle not only had to find a 
corresponding supply of mortgage funding, but also do so in a way that contaminated the entire 
financial system. 
 
 
Here is the last point at which a micro-level argument for sufficiency can be made. The crisis obviously 
stemmed from defaults on subprime and, to a lesser extent, Alt-A mortgages. Even today, while default 
rates on Fannie and Freddie prime mortgages are high by historical standards, at 5 % for loans made in 
2006 and 2007, these rates remain well below the 50 % default rate on privately issued subprime 
mortgages for those years.40 AŶd ǁhile FaŶŶie aŶd Fƌeddie͛s default ƌates ǁeƌe high eŶough to push 
them into bankruptcy in 2008, these rates did not start climbing until well after defaults on subprime 
and Alt-A mortgages had triggered the crisis, the recession, and a substantially higher unemployment 
ƌate. FaŶŶie aŶd Fƌeddie͛s ďaŶkƌuptĐǇ ǁas a ĐoŶseƋueŶĐe ƌather than a cause of the crisis. The subprime 
market is precisely where precarious employment intersected with efforts at self-protection, given weak 
access to employer provided health insurance and pensions. Subprime borrowers were making a 
rational choice, albeit one resting on the irrational assumption that housing prices could only continue 
to rise.  
Yet, as Ŷoted aďoǀe, suďpƌiŵe ďoƌƌoǁeƌs͛ deŵaŶd foƌ ŵoƌtgage ŵoŶeǇ had to ŵeet soŵe 
supply. US public policy had created a minimal flow of mortgage credit into poor neighborhoods through 
the Community Reinvestment Acts of 1977 and 1995. The CRA bound only depository institutions – i.e. 
those whose deposits were covered by federal deposit insurance. The CRA produced a modest 
improvement in minority homeownership, which reached 42.3 % of all black households and 41 % of 
latino households by 1994.41 CRA lending accounted for only 6 % of the total volume of subprime 
lending in 2007, and CRA loans did not default at rates above the entire pool of subprime loans, 
indicating that they were not excessively risky.42  
IŶstead, the pƌoďleŵs ǁith suďpƌiŵe ĐleaƌlǇ eŵeƌged fƌoŵ the ‘epuďliĐaŶ PaƌtǇ͛s deƌegulatioŶ 
of depository institutions and non-regulation of non-bank financial firms – the overwhelming source of 
subprime lending – after 2000.43 Absent these non-bank financial firms, the scale of subprime lending 
would have been much smaller, and the surge of subprime lending characteristic of 2005-2007 would 
not have occurred. This is why the sufficient conditions for the crisis have to be found at the macro-
level, in deregulation of the financial sector. Deregulation and non-regulation allowed supply to meet 
demand in ways that connected previously segregated parts of the financial system, and in ways that 
inverted the old system of maturity matching in pensions and housing. 
 
4: Deregulation, non-regulation and the re-emergence of maturity mismatches  
Sufficient causes for a systemic financial crisis can be found in the end of the macro-welfare 
state that segmented and regulated finance. Deregulation and conscious non-regulation allowed US 
Table 2: Share of US workers with defined benefit and defined contribution pensions 
 1983 1997 2007 
Defined benefit only 62 29 17 
Defined contribution only 12 56 63 
Both 26 15 19 
Source: Boston College Center for Retirement Research, 
http://crr.bc.edu/images/stories/Frequently_Requested_Data/frd_figure_1.pdf 
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financial firms to reconstruct their businesses as comprehensive financial platforms linking all the 
important segments of the financial sector: insurance, retail banking, commercial finance, investment 
banking, and trading on their own account. This increased the probability that any given crisis would 
implicate all paƌts of the fiŶaŶĐial sǇsteŵ. BaŶks͛ effoƌts to tƌade oŶ theiƌ oǁŶ aĐĐouŶt Đƌeated the 
trigger for the crisis. This trading, done through structured investment vehicles (SIVs) domiciled 
offshoƌe, ĐoŶstƌuĐted the aĐtual ŵatuƌitǇ ŵisŵatĐh. BaŶks͛ “IVs ĐoŶŶeĐted the broader commercial 
funding market to the housing finance market by borrowing short term in the money market to fund 
their purchases of nominally long term mortgage assets. Banks connected the insurance industry to their 
SIVs by purchasing insurance via credit default swaps44 against the possibility of SIV default. 
The critical act of deregulation occurred in the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, 
which effectively repealed the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act. Glass-Steagall had segmented the financial 
system, building firewalls between the five core activities list in the prior paragraph. The Financial 
Services Modernization Act permitted American banks to begin constructing enterprises that looked like 
European universal banks. Yet universality, per se, was not the problem. European universal banks did 
not generate the subprime crisis, although their role in the Euro crisis remains understudied. The 
prevalence of the PAYGO-rental model meant that most European banks could not expand mortgage 
lending iŶto the loǁeƌ iŶĐoŵe deĐiles. EuƌopeaŶ ďaŶks͛ iŶaďilitǇ to tƌaŶsfeƌ ƌisk thƌough ŵaƌket ďased 
securitization made it impossible for them to generate outsized volumes of risky mortgages. The crisis 
required not just universality, i.e. connectivity, but securitization in the context of a private pension-
indebted home purchase system for matching maturities. In this regard, it is notable that Dutch and 
British banks were among the hardest hit by the crisis. 
Pre-deregulation securitization differed from post-deregulation securitization, and public 
securitization differed from private. The majority of new mortgages were already being securitized in 
the 1980s, as Fannie and Freddie moved to a model in which they insured MBS rather than held 
mortgages. From 1988 to 2006, new issues of residential MBS rose from $165 billion to $2047 billion. 
But the originators of and the vehicles for securitization changed as financial deregulation permitted 
investment banks and other financial firms to enter Fannie and Freddie͛s territory. Private securitizers 
took ever increasing shares of the market, rising from 9.1 % in 1988 to 55.7 % in 2006.45 Private 
securitizers generated residential MBS in ways that individuated risks for other financial firms rather 
than socializing them. FaŶŶie aŶd Fƌeddie͛s ƌesideŶtial MBS had socialized risk. Losses were distributed 
pro-rata across the financial firms buying a slice of any given pool of mortgages. By contrast, private-
label Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) sliced mortgages and MBSs into tranches with differing risk 
profiles and maturities. CDOs concentrated risk into the lower rated tranches of the CDO. Here, losses 
could wipe out an investor holding those riskier tranches – as happened in 2007-08.  
Both commercial and investment banks – a distinction that became increasingly meaningless in 
the 2000s) – traded CDOs on their own account. They did so by creating SIVs offshore. SIVs were the 
point at which all parts of the financial system met. SIVs inverted the usual matched maturities found in 
the pension-mortgage match-up. SIVs borrowed short term – for 90 to 180 days – in the commercial 
paper market (i.e. money market mutual funds), and then turned around and bought CDOs composed of 
long term, subprime mortgages. This allowed them to arbitrage between the 3 to 4 % interest rate on 
short term loans and the 7 % interest rate that subprime mortgages generated in their first two years. 
SIVs were gambling that those subprime mortgages would be refinanced before the money market 
funds called ďaĐk theiƌ loaŶs to the “IVs. AŶd theǇ ǁeƌe gaŵďliŶg ǁith otheƌ people͛s ŵoŶeǇ, as theǇ 
typically used leverage ratios in excess of twenty to one.  
Leǀeƌage aŶd aƌďitƌage Đould poteŶtiallǇ geŶeƌate douďle aŶd tƌiple digits ƌetuƌŶs oŶ “IVs͛ 
limited equity. But it was also extremely risky. The banks that owned the SIVs understood this. Their 
solution to the risk connected a third segment of the financial sector to housing finance. Banks bought 
insurance against default in the credit default swap (CDS) market from, inter alia, firms like AIG. Non-
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regulation of derivatives also meant that uninvolved third parties could bet against banks and the 
suďpƌiŵe ŵoƌtgage ŵaƌket ďǇ ďuǇiŶg ͚Ŷaked͛ credit default swaps, i.e. credit default swaps where you 
were insuring agaiŶst soŵeoŶe else͛s loss ƌatheƌ thaŶ Ǉouƌ oǁŶ. BǇ ϮϬϬϳ, theŶ, deƌegulatioŶ aŶd ŶoŶ-
ƌegulatioŶ had ďluƌƌed the diffeƌeŶĐe ďetǁeeŶ ĐoŵŵeƌĐial aŶd iŶǀestŵeŶt ďaŶks, aŶd those ďaŶks͛ 
pursuit of above average gains led them to connect short term finance, the insurance industry, and the 
housing finance system together. Banks consciously recreated the mismatched maturity around housing 
finance that had existed before the Great Depression. 
The risks involved in this mismatch did not go unnoticed. But the George W. Bush administration 
had partisan political motivations for exercising regulatory forbearance. Subprime lending was 
concentrated in electorally critical states like California, Arizona, Nevada and Florida. Mortgage lenders 
generated a big and rising share of campaign contributions, and subprime lenders in particular were big 
contributors to the Republican Party.46 A series of well publicized events in 2001 showcased the head of 
the Office of Thrift Supervision, which is one of several US federal government regulators of savings 
banks (i.e. sparkassen), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Company using a chainsaw to cut through a 
stack of regulatory manuals with the help of representatives of bank lobbying associations. Lenders 
regulated by the Office of Thrift Supervision originated about one-sixth of the entire stock of subprime 
loans, and perhaps the riskiest sixth.47  
No one outside the finance industry understood the implications of the SIV investment structure 
described above. But as the outsized scale of subprime lending became apparent, voices in the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency (another bank regulator) and the Federal Reserve were warning that 
rising defaults on these loans posed a considerable threat to the financial system.48 The Bush 
administration made a conscious decision in 2005 not to regulate the rapidly proliferating non-
depository financial institutions that were originating the bulk of the subprime and Alt-A loans. As 
LaǁƌeŶĐe LiŶdseǇ, Bush͛s fiƌst Đhief eĐoŶoŵiĐ adǀisoƌ, said, ͞No oŶe ǁaŶted to stop ΀the housiŶg΁ 
ďuďďle. It ǁould haǀe ĐoŶfliĐted ǁith the pƌesideŶt͛s oǁŶ poliĐies.͟49 The Bush administration also 
pressured Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to securitize more subprime mortgages as a way of rescuing 
increasingly troubled private mortgage originators. All this allowed the scale of the maturity mismatch 
to grow to unstable proportions. 
 
5: Conclusion:  Maturity mismatch 
Housing was the weak pillar of the welfare state and of the welfare state literature. But to put 
the main point bluntly:  it was not the continual expansion of the tax and spend side of the welfare state 
that brought capitalism to its knees. Rather, efforts to unscrew individual and system level social 
protection respectively created the necessary and sufficient conditions for crisis. The increasing 
individuation of risk in the liberal economies forced people in the United States and elsewhere to rely 
ever more on homeownership as a substitute for social risk sharing mechanisms. Individual efforts to 
replace public cash and public services with homeownership pushed home prices up to clearly 
unsustainable levels. By 2006 the ratio of US median housing prices to median income was 60 % higher 
than the average level from 1987 to 1998.  
At the same time, this increased demand for housing had to meet an increased supply of 
mortgage credit. Individual desires for goods they cannot afford do not imply a corresponding increase 
in available credit. The old welfare states supplied credit in a systemically safe way, funding long 
duration liabilities with money from actors desiring to hold long duration assets. They protected 
themselves from unsustainable prices and bad risks by screening their borrowers. The unscrewing of 
financial regulation, of the macro-welfare state, thus dismantled social protection for firms. It removed 
barriers to a systemic crisis. Deregulation permitted financial firms to connect all parts of the financial 
system. In prior crises, usually only one segment of finance found itself in danger, as with the 1980s 
Savings and Loan crisis. Individual firms failed, but other segments of the financial system were 
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unaffected. Left to their own devices, financial firms reconnected formerly segmented parts of the 
financial system inside individual financial firms. Any crisis that brought down the firm would spread the 
crisis to other segments in which the firm was active. 
Non-regulation permitted a race to the bottom in terms of borrower quality.  Regulated 
mortgage markets had their flaws, most notably pervasive racial segregation. But they did successfully 
match low risk borrowers to investors seeking low risks and predictability. Left to their own devices, 
financial firms actively sought out risky borrowers, or pushed borrowers into risky loan products. They 
thus magnified the risks to the entire financial system. Banks in countries where regulation and custom 
limited the subprime market, like Australia or Germany, found themselves implicated through their 
participation in American follies, rather than folly in their own domestic market. 
Finally, left to their own devices, financial firms recreated and magnified the very maturity 
mismatches that were at the center of the banking collapse in the Great Depression. Worse, they 
connected investors seeking relatively risk-free investment in money markets to the extremely risky 
subprime mortgage market. This maturity mismatch between unguaranteed short term lending and long 
term investment provoked the modern version of a bank run, albeit one including financial firms as well 
as individual depositors. The precise timing of that crisis, as with any crisis, was not predictable. But the 
inevitability of a crisis was. And when it came, the sheer size of the mortgage market and the new 
interconnections between all parts of the financial system meant that the crisis would be big, while the 
macro-economic importance of housing meant that recovery would be protracted. 
The salience of the macro-welfare state becomes clear only when we look at both sides of the 
housing finance balance sheet. A balance sheet approach makes two things clear. First, the connection 
between private, indebted homeownership and both smaller public old age pensions and a smaller 
visible welfare state is not simply a matter of individual voting preferences. It also reflected efforts to 
protect financial firms and the financial system from itself by removing a key maturity mismatch from 
the financial system. Second, it helps us determine which causes of the global financial crisis were 
necessary and which were sufficient. In turn, that knowledge allows more precision in addressing those 
causes so as to prevent any future crisis.  
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